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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of the following corporation’s variables: value, 
size, debt policy, growth, liquidity, dividend policy on managerial and institutional ownership in 
the base and chemical industry sector listed on the Indonesia stock exchange during 2010 through 
2014. The findings showed that: (i) Corporation’s value and size variables have significant 
negative effect on managerial ownership; liquidity variable has significant positive effect on 
managerial ownership. On the other hand, debt policy, growth and dividend policy variables have 
non-significant negative effect on managerial ownership. (ii) Corporation’s value and size 
variables have significant positive effect on institutional ownership; debt policy variable has 
significant negative effect on institutional ownership, while growth, liquidity and dividend policy 
variables have non-significant positive effect on institutional ownership.
Keywords: Agency theory, Ownership structure, Corporate value.
Abstrak
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh nilai badan usaha, ukuran badan usaha, 
kebijakan utang, pertumbuhan badan usaha, likuiditas, dan kebijakan dividen terhadap 
kepemilikan manajerial dan kepemilikan institusional pada badan usaha-badan usaha sektor 
industri dasar dan kimia yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia untuk periode 2010-2014.Temuan 
penelitian menunjukkan bahwa (i) variabel nilai badan usaha dan ukuran badan usaha berpengaruh 
negatif signifikan terhadap kepemilikan manajerial, variabel likuiditas berpengaruh positif 
signifikan terhadap kepemilikan manajerial, disisi lain variabel kebijakan utang, pertumbuhan 
badan usaha dan kebijakan dividen berpengaruh negatif tidak signifikan terhadap kepemilikan 
manajerial (ii) variabel nilai badan usaha dan ukuran badan usaha berpengaruh positif signifikan 
terhadap kepemilikan institusional, variabel kebijakan utang berpengaruh negatif signifikan 
terhadap kepemilikan institusional, sedangkan variabel pertumbuhan badan usaha, likuiditas dan 
kebijakan dividen berpengaruh positif tidak signifikan terhadap kepemilikan institusional.
Kata kunci: Teori keagenan, Struktur kepemilikan, Nilai perusahaan.
JEL: G3, M21
1. Research Background
Corporation is an entity which the main aim is maximizing the owner’s wealth through the 
corporation value maximization. To achieve the goal, the management (Managers, CEO, 
Company directors) have to give their best effort in running a corporation.
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Schroder et al., (2001) in Christiawan and Tarigan, (2007) stated the relationship between 
manager and stock holder in agency theory is drawn as relationship between agent and principal. 
Manager role is as the agent and stock holder as the principal. Manager has a role in taking business 
decision in terms of 3 main financial decisions which are investment, funding decision, and 
operational decision.
Manager has the obligation to maximize the stock holder’s prosperity. But on the other 
side, manager also has the interest to maximize their own prosperity. With more information, 
manager can take action which aim is for their profit and do not care about stock holder interest 
(Himmelberg, 1999).
Octaviani (2013) also stated similar think that with the separation of the function between 
ownership and management, therefor will cause negative effect which is corporation managerial 
discretion to maximize their own profit with the cost that has to be borne by the corporation owner.
Husnan (2001) in Prasetyo (2013) stated the corporate ownership structure which is listed in 
Indonesia stock market is dominated by the stock holder in the form of business institution. The 
corporates ownership structure charateristics in Indonesia have high concentration level so that 
sometimes the founder can be the board of direction or commissioner and stock holder that can 
control management of company. The agency problem in Indonesia stock market is the agency 
conflict between majority stock holder and minority stock holder. Ownership structure 
(managerial and institutional ownership) can reduce the agency conflict. So that factors that 
affecting the ownership become important to be researched.
Table 1. Some Research Result that Test Ownership Structure
Research of Managerial Ownership Reseacrh of Institutional Ownership
Variable
Cheung 
& Wei 
(2006)
Drakos 
& 
Bekiris 
(2010)
Davies 
et al., 
(2005)
Shyu 
(2013)
Taswan 
(2003)
Bhattacharya 
& Graham 
(2009)
Tsai 
& Gu 
(2007)
Prasetyo 
(2012)
Al-
Najar 
(2010)
Tobin’s 
Q
-* + + +* - +*
Firm 
Size
- -* - + + - +
Debt -* - - - + -
Growth - -
Liquidity + +
DPR - - +* + + -*
Notes: + is positive significant, +* is positive not significant, - is negative significant, -* is negative not significant
Source: Cheung & Wei (2016), Drakos & Bekiris (2010), Davies et al. (2005), Shyu (2013), Taswan (2003), 
Bhattacharya & Graham (2009), Tsai & Gu (2007), Prasetyo (2013), Al-Najjar (2010)
2. Research Methods
2.1 Types of Research 
This research is causalresearch that aims to know the effect of independent variables which 
are corporate value, size, debt policy, growth, liquidity, dividend policy to dependend variables 
which are managerial and institutional ownership. From the findings, this research is pure research. 
Based on the types of independent and dependend variables that are researched, this research uses 
quantitative research in answering formulation of the problems.
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2.2 Research Design and Operational Definition
Managerial Ownership      Institutional Ownership
Figure 1. Research Hypothesis
MOWN =   0,238 – 0,024 Q – 0,012 FSIZE – 0,012 DR – 0,008 GROWTH +0,00022 LIQ – 0,001 DPR
IOWN   =   0,321 + 0,071 Q + 0,027 FSIZE – 0,074 DR + 0,015 GROWTH + 0,00012 LIQ + 0,006 DPR
Table 2. Variable Operation Definition
No Varible Defination Formula
1 Managerial 
Ownership 
(MOWN)
Stock ownership 
owned by management 
(Board of Directions) 
in corporate 
percentage
𝑀𝑂𝑊𝑁 =  The number of shares ownedby the board of directors𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
2 Institutional 
Ownership 
(IOWN)
Shares owned by 
instituation or 
corporate percentage
𝐼𝑂𝑊𝑁 =  𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
3 Corporate 
Value (Q)
Corporate ability to 
manage resource that 
available in order to 
increase stock holder’s 
prosperity
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑠'𝑠𝑄 =  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
4 Corporate 
Size (FSize)
Size of corporation 
that is measured form 
total sales
F size = In (Total sales)
5 Debt Policy 
(DEBT)
Corporation fund 
dicision in order to get 
source of fund in terms 
of funding company 
operational activity
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
6 Corporate 
Growth 
(GROWTH)
The value that shows 
total asset growth of 
the corporation in the 
future
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻 =   𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑛 ‒  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑛 ‒ 1𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑛 ‒ 1
7 Liquidity 
(LIQ)
The image of company 
ability to finish their 
short-term liabilities
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
8 Dividend 
Policy 
(DIV)
Decision about how 
many recent profits 
that paid as dividend 
as the substitution of 
investment that 
 𝐷𝑃𝑅 =  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
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invested and for 
reinvestment within 
the company
2.3 Data Collecting Procedure
Data collecting steps that is done in this research firstly is by comparing past jurnal of 
researcher that related to ownership structure in order to get variables to be researched. Second is 
choosing the right formulation for each variable. Third is by downloading the financial report of 
9 corporate industrial sectors in www.idx.co.id to choose the most representative industrial sector 
to be researched. Data collected is the managerial and institutional ownership percentage, total 
debt, total sales, current asset, current liabilities, divident per share and earning per share during 
2010-2014 periode, except for total asset data during 2009-2014. Fourth is choose the industrial 
sector throughout managerial and institutional ownership average percentage rank, researcher 
found the most representative industrial sector to be researched are basic and chemical industry. 
Fifth is to process the data in form of ratio. Sixth is tabulation of the data to Microsoft Excel.
3. Result and Discussion
Table 3. Partial Test Result for Managerial Ownership Depended Variables
MOWN = 0,238 – 0,024 Q – 0,012 FSIZE – 0,012 DR – 0,008 GROWTH 
+0,00022 LIQ – 0,001 DPR
Independend 
Variable Coefficient Sig.
Hypothetical 
Direction Information
Constant 0,238 0,000
Q -0,024 0,017 Positive H1 rejected and there is Type I Mistake
FSIZE -0,012 0,000 Negative H1 accepted
DR -0,012 0,207 Negative H1 rejected
GROWTH -0,008 0,709 Positive H1 rejected
LIQ 0,00022 0,002 Positive H1 accepted
DPR -0,001 0,759 Negative H1 rejected
  Source: Data processed
Corporation value variable has coefficient of -0,024 with the significance of 0,017. This 
thing means H1 is rejected and there is type I mistake, corporation value has significant negative 
effect on managerial ownership. This research result is contradictory with the research result of 
Davies et al., (2005) which found that the corporation value has significant positive effect on 
managerial ownership. Meanwhile, Cheung and Wei, (2006) found that corporation value has 
insignificant negative value on managerial ownership. Meanwhile, Drakos and Bekiris, (2010) and 
Shyu, (2013) found that corporation value has insignificant positive effect on managerial 
ownership.
Corporation value has significant negative effect on managerial ownership; this thing is 
supported by the research done by Wahidawati, (2003). The increasing corporation value is 
decreasing the stock ownership by manager. Employee Stock Options Plan (ESOP) is one of the 
forms of compensation that is given to the employee, especially executive employee; stock option 
compensation gives the right to management to buy some amount of company stock in the future 
with the price which is determined when the option is offered before the due date, as long as the 
employee is still working for the company (Huddart, 1994). The purpose of the ESOP in the 
company is to reduce the agency problem and also increasing the corporation value through the 
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performance improvement. With the ESOP mechanism, employee and management have the right 
to buy the company stock in the date and price that has been determined to buy the company stock. 
Therefore, when the corporation value tends to increase, the employee and management will 
realize their options by selling the stock that they have in order to get profit. Therefore, stock 
ownership of employye and management will decrease.
Corporation value has coefficient of -0,012 with significance 0,000. This thing means that 
H1 is accepted, corporation size has significant negative effect on managerial ownership. This 
research result is supported by research of Cheung and Wei, (2006), Drakos and Bekriris, (2010), 
SHyu, (2013), and Taswan, (2003). Corporation size variable has significant negative effect on 
managerial ownership because of the bigger corporation with no increasing of stock ownership by 
manager percentage is the smaller managerial ownership proportion.
Debt policy variable has coefficient of -0,012 with significance of 0,207. This means that H1 
is rejected; debt policy has insignificant negative effect on managerial ownership. This thing is 
supported by the research of Drakos and Bekiris (2010), Jensen et al., (1992) and Wahidawati 
(2003). Meanwhile Shyu (2013) stated that debt policy has significant negative effect on 
managerial ownership. But Taswan (2003), in the other hand, stated that debt policy has significant 
positive effect on managerial ownership. Debt policy variable shows negative and insignificant 
relationship on managerial ownership that can be explained with free cash flow hypothesis, which 
is company that uses high debt level causing financial fied cost burden from the debt will get 
higher so that it will decrease the net profit that available for common stockholders (earnings 
available to common stockholders). That thing causes free cash flow that is about to be paid to the 
company investor in form of dividend also reducing. Therefore, manager will tend to lower their 
ownership. The insignificant debt policy variable caused by manager has perfect information about 
corporation prospect so that debt variable becomes determinant factor of stock ownership by 
manager 
Company growth variable has coefficient of -0,008 with significance of 0,709. This means 
that H1 is rejected; corporation growth has insignificant negative effect on managerial ownership. 
This research result is supported by Cheung and Wei (2006) and also Liang et al., (2001) that 
stated that corporation growth has insignififcant growth effect on managerial ownership. However 
contradictory with research conducted by Taswan (2003) which stated that corporation growth has 
significant negative effect on managerial ownership. Corporation value variable shows negative 
and insignificant way towards the managerial ownership, corporation growth measured by total 
asset growth indicates that the larger corporation total asset increasing without stock ownership 
by manager percentage increasing so that managerial ownership proportion in corporation will get 
smaller. The insignificant of corporation growth variable reflects that corporation growth does not 
become the determinant factor of stock ownership by manager. This thing is proven by the number 
of managerial ownership that remains the same eventhough there is significant growth in 
corporation asset.
Liquidity variable has coeeficient if 0,00022 with significance 0,002.  This means that H1 is 
accepted, liquidity has significant positive effect on managerial ownership. This research result is 
in accordance with the research conducted by Davies et al., (2005) which stated that liquidity has 
significant positive effect on managerial ownership. Company with bad liquidity indicates that the 
company cannot pay their obligation and cannot minimize the bankruptcy risk and financial 
difficulty within the company so that the menagaer will lower the stock ownership in the company 
and vice versa.
Dividend policy variable has coefficient of -0,001 with significance 0,759. This means that 
H1 is rejected; dividend policy has insignificant negative effect on managerial ownership. This 
research result is contrary with the research results conducted by some previous researcher which 
are Drakos and Bekiris (2010), Shyu (2013), and Taswan (2003) which stated that dividend policy 
has significant negative effect on managerial ownership. Dividend policy variable shows a 
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negative and insignificant relationship towards managerial ownership canbe explained with free 
cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986 in Ismiyanti and Hanafi, 2003). Net profit that is available for 
common stock holder (EAC) affecting managerial ownership, which in this terms EAC can be 
distributed to the stock holders in form of dividend or reinvestment to the company as retained 
earnings to fund the next company activity. The higherdividend distributed to the stock holders 
for investment will decrease which will affect the decreasing of investment earnings that supposed 
to be get by investor. Therefore, manager will be less interesting in investing their fund to the 
company or in the other words it will decrease the ownership level. The insignificant of dividend 
policy variable because of the perfect information about company growth prospect that owned by 
management makes dividend policy does not become determinant factor in managerial ownership. 
This thing is proven by research sample in basic and chemical industry sectors corporation during 
2010-2014 periode which even it is not distribute the dividend but the stock ownership by manager 
tend to remain unchanged (permanent). This result is in accordance with the research conducted 
by Jensen et al., (1992) and also Ismiyanti and Hanafi (2003).
Table 4. Partial Test Result for Institutional Owneship Dependend Variable
IOWN = 0,321 + 0,071 Q + 0,027 FSIZE – 0,074 DR + 0,015 GROWTH + 0,00012 
LIQ + 0,006 DPR
Independent Variable Coefficient Sig. Hypothesis Direction Information
Constant 0,321 0,012
Q 0,071 0,031 Positive H1 accepted
FSIZE 0,027 0,001 Positive H1 accepted
DR -0,074 0,018 Negative H1 accepted
GROWTH 0,015 0,826 Positive H1 rejected
LIQ 0,00012 0,836 Positive H1 rejected
DPR 0,006 0,664 Positive H1 rejected
 Source: Data processed
Corporation value variable has coefficient of 0,071 with significance 0,031. This means that 
H1 is accepted, coporation value has significant positive effect on institutional ownership. This 
thing is in contrary with the research result of Battacharya and Graham (2009) that found the result 
of corporation value has significant negative effect on institutional ownership. Corporation value 
has significant positive effect on institutional ownership. This thing caused by institutional 
ownership has supervision function in controlling agency problem so that agency cost decline that 
causes the increasing of corporation value that affect to stock ownership increasing by institutional 
investor within the corporation (Crutchley et al., (1999) in Prasetyo (2013).  
Corporation size variable has coefficient of 0,027 with the significance 0,001. This means 
H1 is accepted, corporation value has significant positive effect on institutional ownership. This 
research result is supported by the research of Bhattacharya and Graham (2009), Tsai and Gu 
(2007), and Al-Najjar (2010). However, the research result is different with the research result of 
Prasetyo (2013) which stated that corporation size has significant negative effect on institutional. 
Corporation size has significant positive effect on institutional ownership because of the big 
company has adequate resource and ability to minimize company investment risk, so that the 
company tend to be spared from financial difficulty and bankruptcy risk. Because of that, 
institutional investor will choose to invest and increase their stock ownership in big companies.
Debt policy variable has coefficient of -0,074 with significance 0,018. This means that H1 
is accepted; debt policy has significant negative effect on institutional ownership. This result is 
supported by research conducted by Tsai and Gu (2007) and also Al-Najjar (2010), meanwhile 
Prasetyo (2013), in the other hand, found that debt policy effect on institutional ownership is 
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significant positive. But, Bhattacharya and Graham (2009) stated that debt policy has negative 
effect but insignificant on institutional ownership. Debt policy has significant negative effect on 
institutional ownership because of the institutional investor in Indonesia has pretty big percentage 
amount of stock in company so that they can be agent to monitor and supervise on fund decision 
making that is made by the company, whereas institutional investors do not like fund resource 
through a bigger amount of debt. Because of that, the lower use of company debt will increase the 
number of stock ownership by institutional investor.
Corporation growth variable has coefficient of 0,015 with significane 0,826. This means that 
H1 is rejected; corporation growth has insignificant positive effect on institutional ownership. This 
research result is contradictory with the research result of Bhattacharya and Graham (2009) which 
stated that corporation growth has insignificant negative effect on institutional ownership; 
meanwhile the research conducted by Prasetyo (2013) stated that corporation growth effect on 
institutional ownership is significant negative. Corporation growth has insignificant negative 
effect on institutional ownership shows that high corporation growth puch institutional investor to 
invest in the company. This thing is caused by by the high corporation growth level will give more 
capital gain for institutional investor compare to low corporation growth level. The insignificant 
corporation growth as institutional investor determinant factor is caused by the purpose of 
investment by institutional investor is for long term so that eventhough there is significant 
increasing and decreasing of corporation growth, the stock ownership by institution tend to remain 
the same (permanent).
Liquidity variable has coefficient of 0,00012 with significance 0,836. This means that H1 is 
rejected; liquidity has insignificant positive effect on institutional ownership. This research result 
is different with the research of Al-Najjar (2010) which is stated that liquidity has significant 
positive effect on institutional ownership. Liquidity shows insignificant positive relationship on 
institutional ownership that shows high liquidity usually considered as positive signal for 
institutional because it indicates that company can easily pays its obligation and face low 
bankruptcy level. The insignificant result shows that liquidity does not become the stock 
ownership by institutional ownership determinant factor. This thing because long term goal of 
institutional investor on investment and proven by the research data that show eventhough 
corporation liquidity is increasing significantly, however stock ownership by institution tend to 
remain the same (permanent).
Dividend policy variable has coefficient of 0,006 with significance 0,664. This means that 
H1 is rejected; dividend policy has insignificant positive effect on institutional ownership. This 
research result is supported by Tsai and Gu (2007), meanwhile Al-Najjar (2010) found that 
dividend policy effect on institutional ownership is significant negative. But Prasetyo (2013) found 
that dividend policy has significant positive effect on institutional ownership. Dividend policy has 
insignificant positive effect on institutional ownership which shows that institutional investor will 
be more interesting to invest on company with strict control mechanism (high) with high dividend. 
Beside that, stock ownership that relatively high in the company make investor hope that their 
investment in a company is safe, has high return whether in form of dividend or capital gain 
(Crutchley et al., (1999) in Prasetyo (2013)). The insignificant result shows that institutional 
investor is less considering corporation dividend policy when they make their investment decision. 
This thing because stock investment that done by institutional investor is more to control to 
company as the stock holder, because the higher institutional ownership, the stronger external 
control on corporation and reduce agency cost.
4. Conclusion
Based on the hypothesis testing by conducting t test in managerial ownership dependend 
variable (MOWN), figured out that corporation value variable has significant negative effect on 
MOWN, corporation size variable has significant negative effect on MOWN, dept policy variable 
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has insignificant negative effect on MOWN, corporation growth variable has insignificant 
negative effect on MOWN, liquidity variable has significant positive effect on MOWN, and 
dividend policy variable has insignificant negative variable on MOWN. With the level of α=5% 
in basic and chemical industrial sector corporation that registered in BEI 2010-2014 periode. 
Based on MOWN variable determination coefficient data can be explained by independend 
variable of 42,8%, meanwhile the rest 57,2% explained by another variable that cannot be inserted 
in this research.
Based on hypothesis testing by conducting t test on Institutional ownership depended 
variable (IOWN), figured out that corporation value variable has significant positive effect on 
IOWN, corporation size variable has significant positive effect on IOWN, dept policy variable has 
significant negative effect on IOWN, corporation growth variable has insignificant positive effect 
on IOWN, liquidity variable has insignificant positive effect on IOWN, and dividend policy 
variable has insignificant positive variable on IOWN. With the level of α=5% in basic and 
chemical industrial sector corporation that registered in BEI 2010-2014 periode. Based on IOWN 
variable determination coefficient data can be explained by independend variable of 12,3%, 
meanwhile the rest 87,7% explained by another variable that cannot be inserted in this research.
For corporation owner and management, agency cnclift in corporation can be minimalized 
witht the stock ownership by managers. Managements are suggested to increase their ownership 
in profitable stock. Beside that, corporation owner is suggested to always do control mechanism 
related to corporation management activity and decision taking that done by management. This 
research also gives the image of corporate governance in which corporation governance 
application in corporation environment is based on needs and awareness that corporation needs 
system and process that managing the relationship and also able to increase the corporation value 
in the eye of another customer, stock holder, government, creditors, and also interest holder 
(stakeholders) by referring to 5 principles: transparency, autonomy, accountability, responsibility, 
and fairness by always pay attention to norm and basic budget. Therefore, company is suggested 
to apply good company governance in order to achieve company goal.
For investor, it is better to invest in company that has high managerial ownership. Because 
with the high managerial ownership, manager will also act as stock holder in the company and 
have the same goal with another investor. Therefore, manager and manager interest can be 
harmonized, which is for maximizing stock holder wealth. But then, investor has to consider 
another factor in investing their fund like corporation performance that can be found out by done 
some fundamental and technical analysis.
This research has limitation that can be opportunity to be conducted as further research. 
First, this research does not consider another variable that can possibly affect the research model. 
This thing can bee seen in the small value of R2 which indicates that there is another variable that 
affect managerial and institutional ownership. Second, this research is limited to basic and 
chemical industrial sector corporation which are registered in Indonesia Stock Market.
With the limitation of the research, students and researcher that want to conduct that kind 
of research are suggested to: (1) add another independend variable that can affect on managerial 
or institutional ownership, such as profitability, risk, investment chance. (2) Add researched 
sector, covering all sectors in BEI. (3) Use MANOVA (Multivariate Ananlysis of Variance) 
statistical technique in order to analyze independend variable effect on some dependend variable 
simultaneously. Remembering that there is a chance ot use MANOVA testing.
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